Nate Sharadin

Book

Epistemic Instrumentalism Explained. (Routledge, 2023)

In Journals

1. Promotionalism, Orthogonality, and Instrumental Convergence. Philosophical Studies. forthcoming.
2. What is it for a Machine Learning Model to Have a Capability? (with Jacqueline Harding). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
3. Personalized Patient Preference Predictors are Neither Technically Feasible Nor Ethically Desirable. American Journal of Bioethics. forthcoming.
4. Morality First? AI & Society. forthcoming.
5. Predicting and Preferring. Inquiry. forthcoming.
6. Spot the Bot. AI & Society. 2024.
7. Large Language Models and Biorisk. (with Harry Lloyd and William D’Alessandro). American Journal of Bioethics. 23 (10):115-118. 2023.
8. Is Deontic Evaluation Capable of Doing What it is For? (with Rob van Someren Greve). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 19 (3). 2021.
9. Ecumenical Epistemic Instrumentalism. Synthese. 198: 2613-2639. 2021.
10. Should Aggregate Patient Preference Data Be Used to Make Decisions on Behalf of Unrepresented Patients? AMA Journal of Ethics. 21 (7):566-574. 2019.
11. Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit (with Finnur Dellsén). Philosophical Studies. 176 (5):1263-1290. 2019.
12. Consequentialism & Moral Worth. Utilitas. 31 (2):117-136. 2019.
13. Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Reason to Believe in Accord with the Evidence. Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809. 2018.
14. Two Problems for Accepting as Intending. Ethics. 128 (3):626-641. 2018.
15. Patient Preference Predictors and the Problem of Naked Statistical Evidence. Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (12):857-862. 2018.
16. Rational Coherence in Environmental Policy: Paris, Montreal, and Kigali. Ethics, Policy and Environment 21 (1):4-8. 2018.
17. The Beliefs & Intentions of Buridan’s Ass (with Finnur Dellsén). Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 3 (2):209-226. 2017.
18. In Defense of Comic Pluralism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 20 (2):375-392. 2017.
19. A Partial Defense of Permissivism. Ratio 30 (1):57-71. 2017.
20. Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2016.
21. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents’ Claims. Utilitas 28 (3):347-360. 2016.
22. How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You’Re Expecting. Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-12. 2015.
23. On Durant Drake’s ‘May Belief Outstrip Evidence?’. Ethics 125 (2):536-539. 2015.
24. Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative). Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1371-1386. 2015.
25. Reasons and Promotion. Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Noûs 25 (1):98-122. 2015.
26. Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):371-399. 2015.
27. Nothing but the Evidential Considerations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy94 (2):1-19. 2015.
28. Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7:1-8. 2013.

In Edited Volumes

1. Depression and Suicide. in The Oxford Handbook of Suicide, eds. Michael Cholbi & Paolo Stellino (Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
2. Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate. in Metaepistemology – Realism and Anti-Realism, eds. Robin McKenna & Christos Kyriacou, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.)

Reviews

1. The Range of Reasons: In Ethics and Epistemology (Daniel Whiting, Oxford University Press, 2022, 240pp). Ethics 133 (3):461-465. 2023. 
2. Epistemic Consequentialism (Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2018, 352pp). Utilitas 32 (2):256-260. 2020.
3. Motivational Internalism (Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2015, 306pp). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2015.